Major technology companies and the billionaire entrepreneurs behind them are becoming geopolitical actors in their own right. A handful of these tech titans now rival nation-states in influence, shaping the rules of the global digital order and even competing with states over governance authority. Some have called this the technopolar world, in which big tech firms act as de facto sovereigns, setting the rules that shape how societies communicate, trade, and even wage war. Their growing leverage raises urgent questions about sovereignty, security, and democracy, as corporate leaders make decisions that have ramifications worldwide.

The twenty-first century’s real geopolitical contest is no longer only between states, but between states and the corporations that command the world’s digital infrastructure. The challenge is not to wrest control back from technology but instead to democratize it, embedding legitimacy within the algorithms, infrastructures, and partnerships that now quietly govern our digital future.

The war in Ukraine brought this shift into sharp relief. Within days of Russia’s 2022 invasion, billionaire Elon Musk provided Starlink, a satellite network managed by his company SpaceX, to keep Ukraine online in the midst of cyberattacks. The private authority of an unelected tech magnate proved vital for the country’s communications and battlefield coordination. Yet, months later, Musk declined to maintain satellite service for a Ukrainian drone mission, raising questions about the U.S. government’s ability to compel private actors to provide critical military support during times of war.

Collectively, the tech sector joined the digital frontlines as a quasi-ally to Kyiv. But Ukraine’s dependence on Starlink also exposed the fragility of outsourcing national security to corporate actors.

Big tech’s reach into the military and intelligence domain now extends far beyond communications. Palantir Technologies, co-founded by entrepreneur Peter Thiel, provides data-driven targeting software used by Western militaries. Meanwhile, the global drone sector has become the new frontier of defense investment, attracting billions in venture capital as unmanned systems transform the conduct, tempo, and scale of warfare. This marks a broader militarization of Silicon Valley, where technologies once designed for civilian innovation increasingly migrate to the battlefield.

These examples show how private corporations increasingly deliver core military functions—command and control, reconnaissance, analytics—that were once the exclusive domain of states. A new military-tech complex has emerged where artificial intelligence start-ups, a growing ecosystem of defense players, and cloud providers wield strategic leverage over national security.

This privatization of geopolitical power poses a profound dilemma. Classical international relations theory assumes sovereignty belongs solely to nation-states. Yet big tech’s control of critical resources, data, algorithms, and satellites has eroded that monopoly. Scholars now speak of tech firms that institutionalize power through market dominance, infrastructural control, and technical expertise as data sovereigns or digital leviathans, taking on functions that increasingly mirror those of states. With their vast scale and economic influence, these companies also enjoy platform power:  privileged access to policymakers, the ability to set industry standards and best practices, and the resources to form transnational coalitions to advance their interests.

What is emerging is not a replacement of sovereignty but a hybrid form. States still legislate, but often govern through corporate intermediaries. Decisions about data storage, online speech, or network access depend as much on the internal rules of digital giants as they do on national law.

This new reality sits uneasily with democracy. Big tech’s geopolitical agency challenges democratic consent and public accountability, not just state power. Executives are not elected by the publics they affect, yet their platforms function as quasi-governance institutions. Increasingly, they also own or influence major media outlets, old and new alike, shaping not only the infrastructures of communication but also democratic elections. This power over narratives is evident in Elon Musk’s takeover of X, formerly Twitter, and Amazon founder Jeff Bezos’s ownership of the Washington Post.

Authoritarian regimes have responded by reasserting control over domestic tech sectors. China’s crackdown on Alibaba signaled that no corporate actor can rival the Chinese Communist Party’s authority. Democracies, by contrast, remain ambivalent. The United States depends on its national champions for economic clout, defense, and intelligence. The EU, meanwhile, pursues digital sovereignty through regulation and investment in indigenous capabilities. These divergent responses reflect a shared concern: how to benefit from private innovation without surrendering public authority.

The ascent of big tech forces a reimagining of global governance. Sovereignty is no longer a binary of state versus non-state but a negotiation among interdependent actors. Decisions by companies, whether to provide connectivity in a warzone or to ban political content, carry geopolitical weight. Yet, current arrangements for oversight are ad hoc and reactive. States alternate between collaboration and confrontation with tech giants, praising their capabilities in crises while decrying their market dominance in peacetime.

Governments must now develop doctrines for dealing with these corporate sovereigns, akin to the strategies once devised for non-state armed groups or private military firms. Several principles could guide this effort. First, institutionalized dialogue between governments and major tech actors is essential. The growing practice of appointing national tech ambassadors should evolve into structured partnerships that clarify expectations during crises, particularly regarding the provision or withdrawal of critical digital services.

Second, international norms are needed to govern corporate behavior and define the responsibilities of tech providers in times of war. Third, democratization must become a core strategic goal across the entire technology stack by embedding public legitimacy within the algorithms, infrastructures, and partnerships that increasingly govern global power.

Finally, states and international organizations should strengthen public resilience by diversifying the supplier base, investing in indigenous innovation, and treating digital infrastructure and the technology stack as strategic resources. The EU’s digital sovereignty agenda and similar initiatives elsewhere are steps toward reducing dependency on a few global monopolies.

Big tech’s rise as a geopolitical force is complex and dangerous, but also transformative. It marks a diffusion of power from states to platforms, from public institutions to private authority. The challenge for Europe and its partners is no longer whether big tech wields geopolitical power, but how democracies can reclaim the authority to govern it.

This publication is part of EU Cyber Direct – EU Cyber Diplomacy Initiative’s New Tech in Review, a collection of commentaries that highlights key issues at the intersection of emerging technologies, cybersecurity, defense, and norms.